Abstract -We pariicipaied in field trials of a semiautonomous vehicle. This gave us an apporiunity io coileci data on operaior inierveniions. In this paper we present an analysis of why and how operators intervene and examine the eflciency of these inierveniions. We compare the results from two trials in very dcferent ierrain io determine how this affected the time and success of the operaior interventions. In particular, we look ai the time it took operators to acquire situational mvareness in order to take the proper inieraciion. We discuss the implications of ihis on human-robot interaciions and inierJaces.
Introduction
We participated in a technical readiness level assessment of autonomous off-road driving vehicles. As researchers in human-robot interaction, our goal was to study when operators were needed, what the operators did, the length of time that the operators took over control, and the success of their actions. The study was conducted over a number of months with trials taking place in three different locations: a dry, arid area, a heavily wooded location, and an urban environment. In this paper we present results from the fKst two locations along with an analysis of the effects of terrain. The analysis of the first experiment, the arid environment, is described in detail in
~31.
We define human-robot interaction as the interactions that have been planned in the design of the human-robot architecture. Human-robot intervention, on the other hand, refers to the need for a human to help the robot overcome a situation that it is unable to handle alone. The vehicles used in this study were designed to be fully autonomous during execution. That is, after an operator supplied a route using way points to the robot, it would navigate to the destination and stop. There were no planned interactions other than the initial route setup.
Data Capture
We captured data about the actions of the vehicle and the operator. Vehicle data came from two log files; a second by second status log and an event log. We used video to capture the graphical user interface (GUI) of the operator control unit (OCU) and the view provided by the robot's camera during real-time tele-operation. We also captured the actions of the operator using video. This allowed us to determine if the operator was monitoring the behavior of the vehicle, tele-operating, or interacting via the GUI. Audio within the vehicle was also captured. We captured the environment on video by using a camera mounted on the safety vehicle.
We used a self-designed and built video and audio capture unit. This was necessary as we had to have a robust unit, suitable for off-road driving. The unit also had to be self powered as there was no extra power available in the vehicle. We used a car jump-start battery to power the scan converter needed to capture the video from the OCU. The video of the operator and the video from the vehicle tele-op screen were fed directly into battery powered mini digital video cameras. Figure 1 shows the outside of the video box. Figure  2 shows the inside of the video box complete with protective foam. Figure 3 shows how the video box was connected to the OCU, the tele-op monitor, the bulletstyle camera, and the operator's audio input. We used remote controls on the outside of the box to start and stop the recording. These are not shown on the schematic drawing.
* U.S. Government work not protected by US. copyright. 
Experiments
Each experiment lasted about ten days. For each experiment, two courses were marked out. The Gold course was an easier course and the Black course was more difficult due to the terrain features. We divided the experiment into a series of runs, where a run was a distance of either 500, 1000, or 2000 meters. There were also two 7000 meter runs per course.
There were three vehicles on each course: the actual autonomous off-road driving vehicle, the safety vehicle, and the operator control vehicle. In the operator control vehicle there was a driver, the operator of the autonomous vehicle, a data collection official, and at times, another observer. Runs could be line-of-sight (LOS) or non-lineof-sight (NLOS). In order to simulate remote operations, the operator was never allowed to directly view the Figure 4 shows the setup of the controls provided to the operator in the OCU vehicle. Besides the OCU, the operator had a joy stick that could be used to tele-operate the vehicle if necessary, and a separate video screen for a view from the vehicles cameras (front and rear). The joystick could also be used to move the front camera. In addition, there were a number of commands that the operator could issue from the user interface. Table 1 lists the trials in the two experiments analyzed in this paper and shows the breakdown of difficulty, length, and type. There were two types of runs: line-ofsight and non-line-of-sight. The operator was never allowed to see the robot in either case. But in the lie-ofsight condition, the operator was able to ask the driver to describe the terrain and conditions around the vehicle to h i . We have not included the 7000m mals in our analysis of the data
Analysis
The physical OCU is shown in Figure 4 . There was a monitor for the GUI, a keyboard for input, a joystick for tele-operating the robot or moving the camera, and a separate monitor for display of the real-time video from the robot. Figure 5 shows the operator's display on the OCU. This display is temporary. The representation of the display is not important to onr analysis. While the display may not be optimal, we were interested in the types of interventions that the operator needed to deal with and the situation awareness that was necessary to successllly help the robot vehicle. The operator was able to see the way points that had been assigned to the vehicle as well as the path the vehicle was taking. The text windows shown in Figure 5 are log files from the vehicle. One displays a second by second status from the vehicle. The other log file is an event record; the vehicle sends a message to this log file each time a different action is taken by the vehicle.
The operator was only allowed to intervene when pre-defmed messages were sent by the vehicle. This was done to eliminate individual operator differences. Table 2 lists the conditions under which the operators could. intervene. 
Interventions
Of the 177 trials in the Arid terrain, there were interventions in 35 trials. Of the 18 1 nms in the Wooded environment, there were interventions in 53 of the nms. There were 44 interventions in total in the Arid environment and 90 interventions in the Wooded environment. That is, the operator had to intervene more than once on some of the trials. Table 3 shows the number of interventions that occurred in the two types of terrain according to type. There were almost double the number of interventions in the Wooded environment as in the Arid environment and the vast majority of those were of the Needoperator type. From the video, it was obvious that most of the Needoperator interventions in the Wooded environment were due to the vehicle trying to find a route around a perceived obstacle three times and failing. The vehicle would try to move forward, find an obstacle in its way and then back up a certain distance and try to plan another route. This strategy was tried three times. If no route around the obstacle was found, the operator was asked to intervene. In most cases, this just involved the operator looking straight ahead with the remote camera, determining if the way was actually clear, and moving the vehicle ahead and then returning to autonomous mode. Non-line-of-sight missions I 43. 3 I 43.4 The percentage of interventions in both cases was evenly distributed across the LOS and NLOS conditions. In the Arid condition, a greater percentage of interventions occurred on the Black course. In the Wooded condition, the percentage of interventions was more evenly distributed across the Gold and Black course. In both conditions, the percentage of interventions increased as the distance increased. Needoperator, were highest on the less difficult, or Gold course. In both environments, as the lengths of the missions increase, the percentage of interventions increases (or in one condition stays even). The main source of problems in the Arid environment was the vehicle slipping while trymg to move up slopes with rather unstable terrain. In the Wooded environment, there were many more obstacles that had to be perceived and avoided.
However, the fact that the majority of interventions in the Wooded environment occurred on the less difficult course is counter-intuitive. We will need to look more closely into the terrain analysis of the Gold and Black courses in the Wooded environment. When the operators took over control, the fust thing they did was to acquire situational awareness by manipulating the cameras to determine what was around. Tables 6 and 7 show the breakdown of the interventions into the average time it took the operator to respond and the average time the operator needed to gain situational awareness. We defined the time to acquire situational awareness as the time the operator was moving the cameras during an intervention. This may have occurred only initially or a number of times during the intervention.
Discussion
The intervention times for the Wooded environment were overall less than the intervention times for the Arid condition. There are several reasons that may account for this. One reason for this may be the order of the trials.
The Arid environment experiment was run prior to the Wooded environment experiment with the same operators. Therefore, their skill levels may have improved. The second reason maybe that it was easier for the operators to deal with interventions (especially Needoperator) in the Wooded environment. We observed also that in the majority of these interventions, the operator just looked straight ahead using the vehicle's remote camera, saw that there was nothing actually blocking the path, took control and drove the vehicle forward for a short time before returning the vehicle to antonomaus mode. Therefore, even though there were more interventions in the Wooded environment, the average time per intervention was considerably reduced. Finding a good path where there was better traction in the Arid environment proved more difficult. Yet a third reason, was the different operator strategies in the Wooded environment. In the Arid environment, we saw a difference between the operators' strategies. One operator used an automatic camera mode which took 18 seconds to pan the environment. The other operator used manual mode which reduced his average intervention time considerably.
In the Wooded environment, neither operator used the automatic camera mode.
Our interest is in how much time the operator needed to acquire situational awareness (SA) for the various types of interventions. There were no plan failures in the Arid environment. The highest amount of SA time in the Wooded environment was needed for plan failure interventions. Again, this is similar to the Needoperator category in that the operator must determine why the vehicle failed, formulate a plan, and set the vehicle back on track. In both environments, the average SA time is high for the Needoperator intervention, consuming 19.5% and 13.3% of the intervention time for the Arid and Wooded conditions, respectively. On average, acquiring SA took over 30 seconds for the Arid condition and over 17 seconds in the Wooded condition.
In these experiments, the operator had no other task than to monitor the vehicle status continuously. Even though the operator did not have a direct line-of-site of the vehicle, he had a good knowledge of the conditions because he was riding in a vehicle following the antonomous vehicle. Therefore, the time to acquire SA was probably optimal.
We had actually expected that the Wooded environment would be the more difficult environment and that the time needed for acquiring SA would be increased. This was not the case as seen above. We did see an effect of terrain, but the Arid environment presented the most diffICUlty.
What are the implications for HRI and user interface design for robotics? First, we can conclude that where possible the robot should provide a diagnosis of the problem. This should be of even more benefit when the operator is remote to the physical environment in which the robot is operating. This means equipping robots with more sensors and presenting the diagnosis in an appropriate fashion. In this instance, the diagnosis was present as a text message. Other presentations might be graphical, such as the example user interface in Figure 6 showing blockages forward and to the left of the robot. The acquisition of SA is another HRI concem.
Endsley, BoltC, and Jones [I] have produced guidelines for developing user interfaces for situational awareness. However, these guidelines are based primarily on the assumption that the operator is continuously monitoring the user interface. What can be done to facilitate the acquisition of SA for an operator who is not continuously monitoring the user interface?
Research on content summaries [Z] may provide an interesting basis for fast acquisition of SA. Content summaries provide visual representations of items in a document that helps the reader to quickly understand what is contained in the document. Can we find key images and status messages that quickly provide an operator with the necessary information to "catch up" on what has been happening? Can we automatically do this based on the different categories of problems that can occur? And will this actually reduce SA acquisition time while providing rich SA?
We have shown that the complexity of the environment certainly affects the acquisition of SA. In this case, our hypothesis about which terrain would prove to be more difficult for acquiring SA was incorrect. What other characteristics of the environment affect the time needed for acquiring SA ? We have yet to analyze the urban environment. In the urban setting we also had the operators execute different types of missions. We intend to analyze this data to determine other factors in the environment that contribute to complexity.
Conclusions and Future Directions
We have computed the time needed for operators of autonomous vehicles to acquire situation awareness in two different field trials. Our analysis shows that, even in ideal conditions where the operators have no additional tasks distracting their attention and are co-located with the vehicle, it still takes a significant amount of time to gain SA. Our analysis shows that the time is reduced for those types of interventions when the vehicle itself can provide an idea of what is needed. We have also shown that in these two field studies, there was a definitive effect of terrain on the type and number of operator interventions. In this case, our hypothesis about which terrain would prove more difficult was incorrect. Although the Wooded environment caused more Needoperator interventions, the operators were able to gain SA more quickly and handle the interventions in less time.
There are two research challenges. First, we need to determine what types of sensory devices could be used to provide the operator with a better understanding of the environment, including research on the appropriate presentation of such information. The second challenge is how to provide situation awareness quickly to an operator who is also working other tasks and is remote to the situation.
